Security
ChainIT Transaction Truth: Stablecoins, Web3 Wallets, and Multi-Rail Commerce. A Zero-Trust Control Plane for Verified Identity, Organizational Authority, Runtime Compliance, Secure Wallet Execution,
arXiv cs.CR0 views
arXiv:2611.24659v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Stablecoins can move value continuously across programmable networks, and Web3 wallets can authorize those transfers with cryptographic signatures, but neither capability, standing alone, establishes a complete commercial transaction. A blockchain may prove that a transaction satisfied protocol rules, and a wallet may prove that sufficient signing authority existed; neither proves who initiated the transaction, for which legal entity, under what current authority, against which current compliance evidence, on what exact instruction, or with what settlement and accounting outcome. We describe the ChainIT Transaction Truth Architecture, a zero-trust control, execution, and evidence architecture that places verified individual and organizational identity, the organizational authority record and authority policy of the ChainIT Authority Protocol, transaction-specific runtime compliance decisions, exact-digest approval, atomic capacity reservation, and a single-use Execution Authorization Credential in front of wallet execution, and that records settlement, reconciliation, and lifecycle evidence after the transaction. The architecture separates five boundaries: control of a key is not identity, identity is not organizational authority, authority is not compliance, compliance is not execution authority, and network confirmation is not complete commercial settlement. We describe wallet and custody profiles, including a multi-party computation (MPC) profile in which custody security is kept independent of business authority, stablecoin and Web3 evidence domains, layered finality, the U.S. stablecoin regulatory context as of September 2026, and a phased deployment in which pilot success requires that the control invariants hold under attack and failure.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24659PreviousRobust, Lightweight Locally Differentially Private Histogram Estimation and the Role of Dropout AttacksNextThe Limit Is in the Input, Not the Model: State-Dependent Command Safety in Natural-Language Interfaces to Industrial Controllers
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