arXiv:2511.19218v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly power web-facing applications, including conversational assistants and content services, where open user interaction exposes them to diverse safety threats and adaptive attacks. In particular, jailbreak attackers repeatedly reformulate harmful requests to bypass safety alignment. Although existing studies have concentrated on defending dynamic jailbreaks, they often retain discovered attacks as flat samples and discard information about how those attacks were found. In this paper, we introduce MACE, an MCTS-guided adversarial co-evolution framework that turns search into policy-learning signals for both an attacker and a defender. Its search component, GS-MCTS, explores multi-step compositions of rewriting operators and associates discovered attacks with empirical success frequency and path depth. Its optimization component, AC-TGPO, uses these statistics for difficulty-aware group-relative credit assignment and constructs a temporally asymmetric curriculum from current interactions, pairings between the latest attacker and preceding defender, and attacks that survive a defense update. Thus, MACE connects search structure to both within-round policy optimization and cross-round memory, rather than using MCTS only to generate attacks or treating each round as a flat adversarial dataset. Removing difficulty-aware weighting, asymmetric samples, or persistent hard samples increases defense ASR-LR by 3.7 %, 6.0 %, and 5.0 %, respectively. Across evaluated models, the resulting attacker achieves the highest ASR-LR in all six model--dataset settings, while the defender reduces average ASR-LR from 11.9 % for the best baseline to 8.8 %.