Originally published at blog.relayshield.net.
PolinRider Is Back in npm, and This Time It Hides Its Servers on Ethereum
On November 4, 2026, Sonatype Research Labs found a concealed loader inside 12 releases of 10 hijacked npm packages. The campaign is tracked as sonatype-2026-010515 and linked to earlier PolinRider activity. The affected packages are ordinary developer tooling: Redux state management, health-check APIs, browser activity tracking, form libraries, and a MongoDB helper for the Hemera framework. None of them looks suspicious on its own. That is the point.
The loader does something unusual. Instead of hard-coding a command-and-control server, it queries public Ethereum RPC endpoints (falling back to Blockscout) for transactions sent by one wallet, 0x1eef0849eda15d87f64e51c73c8442cf3c8bcef3, and reads the recipient address as an IP address: the first four bytes become the primary server, the next four the secondary. The blockchain is the address book, not the payload. When the operators want to move infrastructure, they publish another transaction. No package update is needed, and blocking one server address does not stop the next one from being discovered.
The loader then fetches two stages, /0x/cls and /0x/ls, over plain HTTP on TCP port 443, XOR-decodes them, and runs the code inside the application. Six of the releases hide the loader inside eval(atob(...)). The other six rebuild the code through character permutation and call JavaScript's Function constructor indirectly, avoiding obvious Base64 and eval signatures. Either way, the same wallet, the same paths, and the same XOR keys tie them together.
There is a second trap for defenders. These packages contain no install or postinstall hooks. Disabling npm installation scripts does not neutralize them. The malicious code runs when an affected entrypoint loads; server-hemera-mongo activates during application startup. A lockfile entry alone does not prove the loader ran, and an import error does not prove it did not. Exposure has to be established from what actually executed, not from what was merely installed.
The consequences are concrete. Independent researcher Greenflagged decoded the fallback server address 95.135.181.151 from the wallet's transactions on November 3, an address GitGuardian had already flagged. Retrieved second stages install a Node remote-access trojan and persistence through npm's lib/cli.js and desktop application startup files, with VS Code, Cursor, Discord, and GitHub Desktop among the targets. Once the code has run, removing the package does not reverse the compromise. Hosts must be isolated, evidence preserved, persistence investigated, and accessible credentials rotated.
PolinRider is not the only supply-chain incident this week. On November 9, the Ethersphere project's own release automation shipped a malicious bee-js 13.3.0 to npm and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2, with valid build provenance, a signed and notarized macOS app, and a loader that hunted for the Swarm node's wallet key and its plain-text password. The npm package was the latest version for about 75 minutes. Nothing was forged. The real pipeline built and signed the attacker's commit. Two different campaigns, one week, the same lesson: a trusted package name and a valid signature no longer prove a release is clean.
This is the kind of threat RelayShield's monitoring is built to track. Our bots watch the Telegram marketplaces where stolen publisher accounts, loader kits, and compromised packages change hands, and the threat intelligence corpus records the indicators as they surface: the dead-drop wallet address, the fallback server IP, the hijacked package names and versions, and the payload paths. Screening a server, a domain, a wallet address, or a package name against the corpus checks it against those live indicators before you trust it, and RelayShield's MCP Proxy Firewall screens the tool calls an agent actually makes, so a compromised dependency that tries to reach out at runtime is caught at the call, not after the damage.
One concrete takeaway: audit your dependency tree this week, not your install scripts. Check direct and transitive dependencies, lockfiles, mirrors, caches, and build records for the 12 affected releases, and treat any host where an affected entrypoint executed as fully compromised. Pin or remove the affected versions, block 95.135.181.151, and rotate credentials that were accessible from any exposed machine. The next hijacked package will not announce itself with a postinstall hook either.
Sources: Sonatype Research Labs (sonatype-2026-010515), GBHackers, November 9, 2026; Cyware Daily Threat Intelligence, November 9, 2026; Socket and GitHub advisory GHSA-hh7j-5m3j-23pf on bee-js 13.3.0.

