Last month, the Swiss non-profit foundation Quad9 announced that it will withdraw its free public DNS resolver from France. This difficult decision followed months of litigation and a French court ruling that imposed daily financial penalties on Quad9 for failing to block domains associated with alleged copyright infringement.

Quad9’s departure from France is both disheartening and understandable. The court’s ruling put the organization in the impossible bind of having to choose between crippling litigation and penalties, or fundamentally altering its service in a way that would undermine the privacy and security of its users. Left with no good option, Quad9 is choosing the exit door instead.

The withdrawal of a basic infrastructure service from France fundamentally harms the free and open Internet, and it should serve as a warning of the damage that will result if rightsholders and policymakers continue demanding maximal blocking across every layer of the Internet. It not only deprives French Internet users of a trustworthy and important tool; it creates a real risk of disruption to their daily lives. Quad9’s resolver is used by a wide variety of individuals and organizations in France — including government bodies, educational institutions, hospitals, and utilities — and Quad9 has no way to directly notify those individuals and institutions that their resolver will soon stop working. If the affected parties do not change their resolver before Quad9 removes its service, their Internet will fail with no explanation.

Quad9 is not the first public DNS resolver to withdraw from a country following blocking orders, and it almost certainly won’t be the last. Cisco previously withdrew its OpenDNS resolver from France, Portugal, and Belgium (temporarily) under similar circumstances. And a Belgian court recently issued an order that would impose substantial penalties if Cloudflare, Google, and Cisco do not begin blocking websites through their public resolvers by early January 2027. That’s something Cloudflare has never done.

Cloudflare has spent years advocating against orders of this kind. We are concerned that rightsholders’ unrelenting demands for blocking by public DNS resolvers will end up causing real harm to the Internet.

A refresher on DNS, the Domain Name System

To understand why this is such a problem, it helps to understand how the Internet works under the hood. DNS resolvers are a foundational piece of the Internet’s infrastructure. DNS is the Internet’s address book: when you type a website name such as cloudflare.com, the DNS system translates that domain name into the IP address your device needs to connect to it. A DNS resolver is the service that looks up that address and sends it back to your device, much like an operator finding a phone number in a directory.

DNS resolvers can be operated by anyone, but they are commonly run by Internet service providers (ISPs), mobile networks, businesses, and universities. If you’re reading this blog post at home and have never thought about DNS before, chances are that you’re using your ISP’s default resolver. Because you use your DNS resolver every time that you visit a website, it’s important for it to be reliable and trustworthy.

And because the DNS resolver has access to all of your browsing activity, which resolver you use has real privacy implications.

In addition to DNS resolvers that are provided by your local ISP, there are a variety of public DNS resolvers available. Cloudflare launched our public DNS resolver 1.1.1.1 in April 2018 to give back to the Internet. Our goal was to make a fast, reliable, privacy-first consumer DNS service available for free to everyone. We succeeded. 1.1.1.1 is among the fastest DNS resolvers in the world, including in Europe. Cloudflare's resolver doesn’t collect any user data, let alone sell it to advertisers. 1.1.1.1 has always been one of our favorite examples of Cloudflare fulfilling its mission to help build a better Internet.

1.1.1.1 is one of many public resolvers that anyone can use. In addition to 1.1.1.1 and Quad9’s 9.9.9.9, some of the other best-known public resolvers include Google’s 8.8.8.8 and Cisco’s OpenDNS. Just because these services are offered for free doesn’t mean they’re easy to provide. A well-run global public DNS resolver is an extraordinary engineering feat, built to securely and privately resolve hundreds of billions or even trillions of queries a day across a globally distributed network of hundreds of server locations.

As Quad9 notes, there are many other DNS resolvers available to users, many of them offered by essentially anonymous services whose practices are unknown or undocumented. It’s easy to change your DNS resolver, and people do so for a variety of reasons including performance, reliability, or to access specific security features.

Why public DNS resolvers should not be required to block

Rightsholders have a legitimate interest in preventing online piracy. But trying to address online infringement through public DNS resolvers is fundamentally the wrong approach.

Among other things, such blocking is ineffective. Think back to the analogy of an operator finding a phone number in a directory. If a court wants to shut down an illegal business, forcing the directory operator to cross the business's name out of the phone book doesn't actually close the business. The storefront is still open, the products are still there, and anyone who already knows the address, or uses a different phone book, can walk in.

The same is true for the Internet. DNS resolvers are just one link in the transmission chain. The only way a DNS resolver can “block” content is by declining to return the IP address for a particular website. But a public DNS resolver cannot remove the actual infringing content from the Internet, nor can it take down the servers hosting it.

Because of this, blocking by public DNS resolvers is remarkably easy to bypass. Any Internet user who wants to reach a blocked site can circumvent the block in less than a minute simply by switching to one of the thousands of other DNS resolvers available online. In fact, users don’t even need a resolver at all to reach infringing content if they already know the underlying IP address. Unsurprisingly, while blocking via public resolvers may inject some friction for some users when accessing content, there is no evidence that it actually reduces the total amount of online infringement that occurs.

In addition to being ineffective, as we’ve written previously, DNS blocking is a blunt instrument that causes collateral damage. Because DNS operates at the domain level, a resolver cannot block a specific infringing video or file; it must block the entire domain. This affects all content on that domain, whether legal or illegal. It is also entirely opaque to the user: when a resolver is forced to block a domain, the website simply fails to load. The user receives no explanation or legal notice, making it impossible to know if the site is down for maintenance, if their network is broken, or if the site was blocked by a court order.

The problem is substantially worse with respect to public DNS resolvers. Because public resolvers operate globally, any blocking will naturally cross borders, meaning that a single country could dictate what content is accessible around the world. For example, while the EU-dedicated DNS resolver DNS4EU operated by Whalebone blocks in response to country-specific orders, it does so across the entire EU. Efforts to reengineer public DNS resolvers to allow for more localized blocking would fundamentally alter the service, harming performance and resilience, undermining user privacy, and fragmenting the open Internet.

For these reasons, Cloudflare, Google, Cisco, and Quad9 have all opposed efforts to mandate blocking by public DNS resolvers, with some success. Several years ago, courts in Germany ruled in favor of Cloudflare and Quad9, rejecting requests to require DNS blocking. More recently, a French court rejected penalties against Cloudflare for failing to block through 1.1.1.1, finding that other actions we had taken through our CDN and reverse-proxy service were sufficient to comply with the underlying order.

Undeterred, rightsholders have continued to press for blocking by public resolvers with a level of determination that is hard to explain. A recent study found that the majority of online piracy in Europe is hosted in Europe. If rightsholders want to genuinely address online infringement, there are far better places to focus their efforts — most notably by requiring the hosting providers who actually store the pirated files to take them down.

Forcing public DNS resolvers out of markets hurts the Internet

The French court’s penalty order against Quad9 represents the culmination of these rightsholder efforts. As a small non-profit that only offers a public DNS resolver, Quad9 had no alternative methods for demonstrating compliance with the order. The French court therefore granted rightsholders’ request to issue penalties for non-compliance, forcing Quad9 to undermine its own service or leave the country.

Quad9’s withdrawal from France represents a genuine loss for the Internet. In the short term, removal of Quad9’s resolver is likely to cause immediate and potentially severe disruptions to Internet access. Because of the way their service is set up to preserve privacy, Quad9 has no way to know who exactly is using its resolver, let alone to directly communicate to them about the upcoming withdrawal of services. That means that individuals, hospitals, universities, and government offices all may be caught unaware when the resolver stops working. Again, because of how DNS resolvers work, those users will not receive a detailed error message explaining what happened — their Internet will simply stop working. The problem will be even worse when devices like security systems or thermostats are hardwired to use Quad9’s resolver. Fixing these issues may be slow or even impossible.

More generally, driving Quad9 out of France does absolutely nothing to prevent online infringement, but it does leave everyday Internet users with fewer safe, reliable options, particularly ones like Quad9 that also protect users from phishing and malware. Taking established public DNS resolvers away forces Internet users to fall back on the default resolvers offered by their ISPs (which may monetize their browsing data), try lesser-known resolvers operated by anonymous or less trustworthy organizations, or run their own resolver. The irony is that Quad9 and Cloudflare are being pulled into court precisely because we are transparent, reputable organizations. Penalizing transparent services only pushes users toward less accountable corners of the web.

The way forward

If nothing else, we hope that Quad9’s announcement may serve as a wake-up call to rightsholders and policymakers that seeking to block infringement at every layer of the Internet has real costs.

We believe there are far better ways to work together to fight piracy without compromising the integrity of the Internet, and Cloudflare continues to pursue innovative collaborations to that end. Our collective efforts in addressing online infringement would be put to better use in seeking to have such content removed at the hosting provider, which would both achieve a more durable solution and avoid collateral damage to the Internet.

In the meantime, we will keep resisting misguided efforts to require blocking by public DNS resolvers. Along with Google and Cisco, we have appealed the Belgian order that would impose penalties on us if we do not start DNS blocking by January 2027. We hope to get a resolution before the end of the year that would avoid another situation like the one Quad9 faces now in France.

We have grave concerns about the disruption that would be caused if additional resolvers are forced to withdraw from markets, and we will continue to advocate against that possible result.