Originally published at security.hackerme.ai.

Nobody had to find a clever bug here. On 17 November 2026, someone logged in to Rackspace Spot with credentials that had leaked, and for most of that day they could do what real customers do. That is the part that bothers me. According to Rackspace's notice to customers about the Rackspace Spot breach, as reported by BleepingComputer, the access ran from about 00:20 to 22:00 UTC. Call it nearly 22 hours.

If your website, store or app runs on someone else's cloud, this is worth ten minutes of your week.

What happened in the Rackspace Spot breach

Rackspace Spot is a managed Kubernetes cloud. You rent servers through an auction, and Rackspace runs the clusters for you. Your apps run there, and so do the passwords and keys those apps need.

Here is what Rackspace told affected customers, in the notice BleepingComputer obtained:

  • On 17 November 2026, about 00:20–22:00 UTC, "an unauthorized party used leaked credentials to access parts of Rackspace Spot."
  • In some customer organizations, the attacker could act as a legitimate user. They could create pods (small units that run code in a cluster), read Kubernetes Secrets, and list nodes and volumes.
  • They could have read any Secret in an affected user's clusters, plus any Spot API tokens or refresh tokens that user held.
  • Rackspace learned about it on 18 November, from a customer report.

Rackspace says it revoked the affected tokens and sessions, removed the unauthorized pods, rotated keys and tightened access controls and monitoring.

Then the outage. The Spot console was down for days during the cleanup. On Rackspace's own GitHub discussion board for Spot, Sirish Raghuram, co-founder of Platform9, which built Spot with Rackspace, wrote on 20 November that "an observability system was breached using a compromised credential." He called it a critical error. A Spot team post on the r/rxt_spot subreddit said service was fully restored on the morning of 21 November, Pacific time. Spot's status page now says new sign-ups are paused until 25 November.

Two things are still unknown. How many customers were affected, and whether data was actually copied out. BleepingComputer asked Rackspace both questions and got no answer.

Who is affected

The notice covers Rackspace Spot customers whose organizations were hit. It is not a notice about every Rackspace service, and I have not seen anything saying other Rackspace products were touched.

Not on Spot? Keep reading anyway. Your site has secrets too: the database password, the payment gateway key, the email service key, the Git token your developer deploys with. They sit somewhere at your host. If someone with a stolen login can read that place, they hold your keys too.

I wrote about how fast this goes in the Docker Hub leaked keys case, where a key was abused seconds after it went public. Same lesson here, slower clock.

What to check this week

If you are a Spot customer, Rackspace's list is clear. Reissue your Spot API tokens. Replace refresh tokens used in automation. Download a fresh kubeconfig. Rotate every credential stored in your cluster Secrets. Then go through the logs of your databases, container registries, Git repos, cloud storage and third-party services back to 17 November.

Rackspace also shared signs to look for: the IP address 23.224.79.106, the range 23.224.0.0/15, and pods or objects whose names start with i1, glm- or probe. A pod called probe can be harmless, so treat a match as a reason to look, not as proof.

One detail people get wrong: changing the value inside the cluster is not enough. A database password or API key that was read stays valid until you revoke it at the service that issued it. Make the new key first, kill the old one, then update the Secret and restart what uses it. Our guide to API token rotation after a breach at a tool your site uses walks through the order.

If you are not on Spot, ask your host or developer three plain questions:

  1. Where are our site's passwords and API keys stored?
  2. Who and what can read them?
  3. When were they last changed?

If nobody can answer, that is your answer. It also helps to know what your host handles for website security and what you still need to check.

How leaked cloud logins end up on the dark web

Rackspace has not said where the credentials came from. So I am not guessing about this case. In general, though, the path is boring and common. Malware on a laptop scoops up saved passwords and session cookies. Keys get pasted into public code or baked into container images. Those logs and keys get bundled and sold on criminal markets and Telegram channels, and working access to a cloud account is exactly what buyers look for.

The buyer does not need to be skilled. They just log in. That is why a stolen login is so dangerous: to the system, it looks like you. A dark web scan can tell you if your company's emails show up in known leaks. It cannot tell you about a key that was sold privately yesterday. Rotation can.

FAQ

Was Rackspace hacked?

Rackspace says an unauthorized party used leaked credentials to access parts of Rackspace Spot on 17 November 2026. Platform9's co-founder said an observability system was breached with a compromised credential. So it was a break-in with stolen logins, not a disclosed software flaw.

Was customer data stolen?

Not confirmed. Rackspace says the attacker could have read Secrets and tokens in affected accounts. It has not said whether anything was copied out, or how many customers were affected.

I am not a Rackspace customer. Should I care?

Yes, if your site runs on any cloud. Ask where your keys live, who can read them, and when they were last changed.

A simple first step

Rotating keys is the real fix. A quick outside check is a good start. You can run a free website security scan to see what an attacker sees from the outside. It will not read your cluster or your host's systems, and it does not prove you are safe. But if you want a website vulnerability scanner that takes a few minutes and no setup, it is a reasonable place to check your website's security before you call your host.