AI & ML
Stealing Exact Training Data from Other Clients during Federated Learning
arXiv cs.DC0 views
arXiv:2611.24689v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malicious adversaries can employ gradient inversion attacks to reverse-engineer private data using the model updates of a round in Federated Learning. While there have been developments in gradient inversion for text, exact text recovery by a malicious client has so far remained infeasible, as FedAvg entangles the gradient contributions of many clients and obscures the signal of any individual sentence. We introduce a novel attack pipeline that unwinds this entanglement progressively through an iterative loop, in which the gradient contributions of sentences recovered exactly in one round are subtracted from the aggregate, exposing the remaining sentences for recovery in the next iteration. We show, for the first time, exact sentence recovery, with 100% precision, and on aggregates containing up to $4\times$ more tokens than the model's hidden dimension, we recover up to 80.2% of client sentences exactly, a regime where existing attacks recover none exactly.
Source:https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.24689PreviousHarvesting Expert-Parallel Bubbles for Fine-TuningNextDispersedBFT: Bottleneck-Free Primary-Backup Consensus using Dispersed Replication
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