arXiv:2611.25272v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The standard 5G Authentication and Key Agreement protocol (5G-AKA) authenticates subscriber credentials but does not verify the integrity of user equipment (UE). Existing literature includes admission-time device-certificate authentication and Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-based measured-boot attestation, which can additionally verify that the UE presents enrolled device credentials and boots into an approved state. However, these checks do not reveal whether harmful unauthorized software is executed after admission. We present TRACE-5G, which continuously verifies the UE's runtime software state and uses the resulting trust state to control network access. TRACE-5G retains the pre-admission certificate and boot checks, and in addition places the admitted UE in restricted connectivity while runtime integrity is verified. Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) records runtime software measurements, TPM PCR (Platform Configuration Register) cryptographically accumulates them, and Keylime, a remote-attestation framework, repeatedly evaluates TPM and IMA evidence against enrolled references. A Trusted result grants full access on the existing PDU session, but an Untrusted result withholds or removes full access and causes network deregistration. We implement TRACE-5G on an srsRAN/Open5GS testbed with a hardware TPM2.0 UE and core-side firewall enforcement. Across ten trusted trials, Level 2 access was established in 9--12s. Across ten untrusted trials, promotion was consistently withheld; in a representative trace, restrictive policy was applied within 5ms of the Untrusted decision and UE-context release completed within 1.670s. TRACE-5G extends UE trust beyond admission without any modification of the standardized 5G protocols.