AI agents ask for passwords. I made sure they never see them
How to give an AI agent access to secrets without leaking them. Based on a real product: TenVault 1.0 / AgentVault (Windows, Rust + Tauri).
The problem that arrived quietly
A year ago an "AI agent" was a toy: it wrote code and sometimes hallucinated. Today agents (Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code extensions, custom bots) work on real projects — which means they need keys and passwords: OpenAI, Stripe, databases, staging environments.
The usual workarounds are bad:
-
.envin the project. The agent reads it. Best case it does not decide to "improve" the config or paste it into a 100k-token context. - Copy the key into a prompt. It lands in logs, chat history and the provider's cache. Game over.
- A cloud secrets manager. Overkill for a personal project, and in some countries a data-residency and payment question.
- Do nothing. The agent simply cannot work with real secrets, and you paste keys manually every time.
I wanted a third way: secrets stay local, the agent gets them only with my consent and only for a while. That is how AgentVault appeared — the "Agents" tab inside my password manager TenVault.
What a regular MCP setup gets wrong
MCP (Model Context Protocol) is the standard that connects tools to models. There are already servers that serve secrets from Vault/1Password/Bitwarden. Typical flow:
Agent -> MCP server -> vault API (with a master token) -> secret The problem: the MCP server usually holds full access. If it is compromised (or prompt-injected), the agent gets everything the token allows, without you noticing.
What I wanted instead:
- the agent sees only the names of the records you explicitly shared;
- the value is released after your approval in the UI, not on request;
- access is a lease with a TTL (one hour by default), not a permanent grant;
- everything is written to an audit log you can read;
- the master password is never passed to the agent and never sits in an env variable.
How it works
Components:
- TenVault desktop — a Rust password manager (XChaCha20-Poly1305 + SQLCipher), GUI as a local HTTP server, tray icon.
- tenvault-mcp — an MCP server (stdio JSON-RPC). It talks to the running app over a local bridge (HTTP + token file), not through the master password.
- Agents tab — approvals, leases, limits, policies, audit.
- Encrypted audit — a separate file, key derived from user + machine + vault path.
Request flow:
Agent (MCP) --get_secret--> tenvault-mcp | local bridge (HTTP, token) v TenVault GUI | banner "Agent requests a secret..." | [Allow for 1 hour] [Deny] | lease (TTL) ----> value to agent | encrypted audit log Key decisions:
- MCP never knows the master password. It gets a bridge token from the running app. No app — no access (or an explicit "agent key" you can create and revoke).
- Per-record granularity. A record has an "Available to agents" flag. Only those records appear in
list_secrets. - Categories. Policies: API keys allowed, website passwords denied, records with notes separate.
- Leases. A grant lives for a TTL (3600 seconds), the number of leases per record is limited (3), and "revoke all leases" is one click.
- Limits. A daily request limit per agent; after exceeding it — denial and an audit entry. A denial starts a 10-minute cooldown to prevent request spam.
- Process checks. off/warn/strict: in strict mode the agent only gets access if its parent process is on the allowlist (e.g.
cursor.exe).
Setup, in practice
- Install TenVault (no admin rights needed).
- Optionally generate an "agent key" if the MCP server must work while the vault is locked.
- Point your client at the MCP server:
{ "mcpServers": { "tenvault": { "command": "C:\\Users\\you\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\TenVault\\tenvault-mcp.exe", "args": ["--vault", "C:\\Users\\you\\AppData\\Roaming\\TenVault\\vault.json"] } } } - The agent calls
get_secret("STRIPE_SECRET")and receives-32003 confirmation requireduntil you press Allow. - Then the agent repeats the call and receives the value, under a lease.
- Everything lands in the audit log: who asked, when, what, and how it ended.
What is actually protected — and what is not
Protected:
- secret values never leave the machine;
- the agent sees only shared records;
- nothing is released without approval (or an explicit auto-grant);
- access is time- and count-limited;
- the audit is encrypted and accessible only to the user.
Not protected (being honest):
- if the agent is compromised and already has the value, it can use it until the lease expires;
- prompt injection can make the agent ask for a secret — but it still needs your approval;
- unsigned Windows binary: SmartScreen complains (code signing is planned);
- no mobile approvals yet (in progress); meanwhile Telegram/VK notifications with buttons.
It is not a silver bullet — it is surface reduction: the agent has no standing access, and you have a log.
Implementation notes
- Rust for the core and the local GUI server: small binary, no C dependencies.
- Tauri + WebView2 for the window: the UI is plain HTML over a local server (easy to test).
- SQLCipher for the database, XChaCha20-Poly1305 for fields.
- A custom NSIS installer (the Tauri bundler had to be bypassed), per-user install, start menu shortcut, clean uninstall.
- Updates: download exe → verify SHA256 → install or swap → restart; rollback keeps the previous installer.
- Notifications: local toast + sound; Telegram through a small PHP relay on our domain (in some regions
api.telegram.orgis not directly reachable), with Allow/Deny buttons right in the message.
What is next
- mobile approvals (the Android app exists; an "Agents" screen is being added);
- ready-to-use configs for Claude Desktop and Cursor;
- code signing and macOS (when resources allow);
- more integrations: custom MCP clients, CI secrets.
Links
- Download: https://tenlux.tech/tenvault/ (Windows, free in beta)
- AgentVault page: https://tenlux.tech/tenvault/agents/
- Article (RU): https://tenlux.tech/blog/ii-agenty-dostup-k-sekretam.html
How do you give secrets to your agents: .env, a password manager, cloud, or manually? Tell us in the comments.

