CVE-2026-110782: Cryptographic Signature Verification Bypass and Cross-IdP Impersonation in SimpleSAMLphp SAML2

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-110782
CVSS Score: 8.7
Published: 2026-11-17

CVE-2026-110782 is an authentication bypass and cryptographic signature verification failure in the SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 library (simplesamlphp/saml2). Resulting from an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-49283, the HTTP-Artifact binding implementation verifies the outer ArtifactResponse signature but unconditionally returns unsigned embedded SAML Responses without verifying signatures or validating that the embedded issuer matches the artifact issuer. In multi-IdP federation environments, an attacker controlling one trusted Identity Provider (IdP) can forge arbitrary identity assertions claiming to originate from another trusted IdP.

TL;DR

SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 versions 6.2.2 through 6.2.3 and 7.0.0-rc1 fail to mandate signatures or enforce issuer binding on embedded SAML Responses received via the HTTP-Artifact binding. An attacker controlling a single federated IdP can encapsulate an unsigned SAML Response claiming to be from another IdP inside a validly signed ArtifactResponse, bypassing authentication and achieving cross-IdP user impersonation.

⚠️ Exploit Status: POC

Technical Details

  • Vulnerability Type: CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature / CWE-287: Improper Authentication
  • Attack Vector: Network (SAML 2.0 HTTP-Artifact SOAP Resolution)
  • CVSS v3.1 Score: 8.7 High (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N)
  • Affected Component: SimpleSAML\SAML2\Binding\HTTPArtifact::receive() in src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php
  • Impact: Cross-IdP authentication bypass and arbitrary user impersonation in multi-IdP federations
  • Exploit Status: Proof-of-Concept Available (Unit Test Suite)
  • CISA KEV Status: Not Listed
  • Patched Versions: simplesamlphp/saml2 6.2.4 and 7.0.0-rc2

Affected Systems

  • SimpleSAMLphp SAML2 Library (simplesamlphp/saml2)
  • simplesamlphp/saml2: >= 6.2.2, < 6.2.4 (Fixed in: 6.2.4)
  • simplesamlphp/saml2: >= 7.0.0-rc1, < 7.0.0-rc2 (Fixed in: 7.0.0-rc2)

Code Analysis

Commit: 7b7fbb5

Mandate signed SAML Response and verify entity ID matching in HTTPArtifact::handleReceivedArtifactResponse() for 6.2.4 release.

Commit: 9a21edb

Mandate signed SAML Response and verify entity ID matching in HTTPArtifact::handleReceivedArtifactResponse() for 7.0.0-rc2 release.

Exploit Details

  • GitHub: Official regression test suite (HTTPArtifactNefTest.php) demonstrating both the unsigned embedded response bypass and cross-IdP impersonation vectors.

Mitigation Strategies

  • Upgrade simplesamlphp/saml2 to version 6.2.4 or 7.0.0-rc2 (or later) to enforce signature verification and entity ID binding on embedded HTTP-Artifact responses.
  • Disable the SAML 2.0 HTTP-Artifact binding on Service Providers if not operationally required, utilizing HTTP-POST binding instead.
  • Enforce independent signature verification on the inner saml:Assertion element in downstream application consumers.
  • Restrict trusted Identity Provider metadata entries to strictly necessary federation partners.

Remediation Steps:

  1. Audit composer.lock across all PHP applications to identify deployments running simplesamlphp/saml2 versions >= 6.2.2, < 6.2.4 or 7.0.0-rc1.
  2. Execute 'composer require simplesamlphp/saml2:^6.2.4' (or '^7.0.0-rc2' for 7.x branches) to install the patched library.
  3. Verify that all federated Identity Providers using the HTTP-Artifact binding sign both the outer ArtifactResponse and the embedded SAML Response, as unsigned embedded responses will now be rejected with an exception.
  4. Review authentication logs for any historical ArtifactResponse exchanges where the inner Response Issuer differed from the resolving IdP entity ID.

References

Read the full report for CVE-2026-110782 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.