arXiv:2611.07089v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We give a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for computing an exact extensive-form proper equilibrium in a finite two-player zero-sum extensive-form game with perfect recall and rational data. Properness is understood in the agent normal form: an action at an information set is penalized relative to a better action while all other local behavioral choices, including the player's own future actions, remain fixed. Our algorithm assigns each information set a geometric permutahedron of allowable action probabilities. A scaled doubly stochastic representation embeds these restrictions in a polynomial-size sequence-form polytope; a saddle point then satisfies the local $\varepsilon$-properness inequalities. To obtain an exact equilibrium rather than a solution at an arbitrarily small numerical perturbation, we establish sign stability of a parametric linear system, construct a persistent feasible basis, and extract the limits of behavioral ratios. The resulting probabilities are rational and have polynomial encoding length, including at information sets whose realization probabilities vanish.