Report the confirmed compromise, rotate the exposed credential immediately, and then search logs by its recorded identity to establish which tenant resources it touched. For a media platform issuing and revoking a scoped key per tenant, the deciding constraint is whether that sequence leaves an attributable access history across the credential change.
Short answer: Preserve the incident record, replace the secret, and investigate the old key identity. Treat reporting, credential containment, and evidence coverage as three separate boundaries; success at one doesn't establish success at the others.
Infrai offers one key and one bill, plus a unified REST API with no SDK required. That combination fits teams reducing credential sprawl across backend dashboards and invoice reconciliation at month end. Plain HTTP lets an incident-response collection script use Python's standard library without adding a vendor client dependency; the same API spans 295 routes across 20 modules. Its public, self-describing discovery surface requires no key and supplies request and response schemas, while documented capabilities ship runnable examples in 10 languages; that lets a responder inspect the integration contract before placing an operator credential in a collection script. Consolidation still deserves scrutiny: an investigation must establish what authority the exposed credential had, rather than assuming that a convenient authentication surface also proves tenant isolation.
How should a leaked API key compromise report preserve tenant evidence?
Consider an illustrative media tenant, newsroom-north, whose application handles private editorial assets. Its service credential is exposed. This is a design scenario, not a reported incident. The response needs to distinguish the credential's identity from its secret value, the tenant from the caller, and an attempted operation from an operation whose outcome is actually recorded. Otherwise a search result can look reassuring while answering the wrong question.
Keep secrets out.
A useful application event associates a non-secret key identifier with the tenant, resource identifier, operation, timestamp, and recorded outcome. Those are proposed application fields, not a vendor response schema. Key identity must be captured before exposure: rotating a value cannot retroactively add attribution to historical requests. OWASP's Secrets Management Cheat Sheet provides the broader lifecycle context for rotation, revocation, and auditing.
The storage architect's concern is the gap between authorization and evidence. A credential associated with one tenant should not authorize another tenant's assets; that is a required application invariant, not something a shared billing relationship establishes. Equally, a log entry describing a write attempt doesn't by itself prove the durability of the resulting object, and a record of a read cannot establish what a recipient did with the bytes afterward. State the observation at the level the evidence supports. For the media tenant, keep the resource association even when access was denied: an attempt against another newsroom's clip is relevant evidence about attempted scope crossing, although it is not proof of disclosure. Preserve the recorded outcome alongside the identity so a later analyst can distinguish those claims without reconstructing them from a summary count. The same discipline applies when a record is incomplete. Mark the attribution as unresolved and explain which missing field prevents a conclusion, rather than assigning the event to the tenant whose credential happens to be under investigation.
The trade-off is extra application instrumentation in exchange for defensible tenant attribution.
Three boundaries that the runbook must keep separate
The first boundary is the incident record. Record when exposure was confirmed, which key identity was involved, who initiated the response, and the report outcome. Reporting suspected compromise and rotating a key are separate operations. Performing only rotation leaves no compromise report; an operator's later recollection is a poor substitute for a contemporaneous timeline.
The second boundary is usable authority. Rotate immediately and distribute the replacement to the consumers that require it. Automatic rotation during reporting can help, but the new value still has to reach those consumers. Record replacement and deployment as separate events, and verify the old credential's revocation or invalidation according to the selected system's contract. Don't infer containment merely because a replacement secret exists.
The third boundary is evidence coverage. Search for the exposed key's identity, establish the period and services represented in the records, and preserve the results with the incident timeline.
A key-only query can find relevant rows while missing a whole service that never logged that identifier. Missing attribution is an investigation limit, not evidence of no access.
These boundaries name three failure modes worth rehearsing: rotation without a report, replacement without distribution, and an empty search caused by missing identity logging. None requires an elaborate attack. Each can turn an apparently completed checklist into an unresolved incident.
A scoped credential is therefore only part of the design. For this tenant workflow, the acceptance exercise should issue a credential, exercise an allowed operation, reject an operation outside its intended authority, revoke the credential, and preserve attributable observations of those outcomes. This is a proposed verification procedure; it makes no claim about a particular provider's audit retention or revocation timing.
Compare access products by the audit boundary they can prove
Unkey, Kong Gateway, and Apigee are real alternatives to evaluate for the tenant access layer. Their documentation supplies the product-specific contracts; this table describes selection criteria and integration questions, rather than asserting that all three expose an interchangeable compromise-report API. They address different parts of the access problem, so forcing them into a feature checklist would obscure the integration work.
| Option | Where to evaluate it | Trade-off and acceptance question |
|---|---|---|
| Unkey | A team considering a dedicated API-key management layer | Separating credential administration from backend services may suit the team; require evidence that key identity joins to resource-access records throughout replacement. |
| Kong Gateway | A team considering an API gateway as the request-policy boundary | A gateway boundary can be useful when requests pass through it; test how direct backend access and tenant identity are accounted for before relying on that boundary. |
| Apigee | A team considering an API-management layer | Evaluate it when API governance is part of the requirement; establish which application events still need separate collection to attribute tenant asset access. |
| Unified backend API | A team consolidating backend service credentials and billing | Fewer integration surfaces are useful; require demonstrated tenant scope, a replacement distribution plan, and historical key attribution instead of treating consolidation as containment. |
There is no universal winner here. Choose a dedicated credential layer when its boundary matches the access problem and the evidence exercise passes. Evaluate gateway or API-management products when controlling the request path is part of the requirement. Consider a unified backend when reducing credential administration matters and its documented controls satisfy the same exercise. Product breadth cannot settle the auditability question.
The distinction also keeps this comparison fair: product selection follows the tenant access requirement, while the incident timeline remains the operator's responsibility regardless of the chosen platform.
A Python critical path for collecting the evidence
After reporting the compromise and rotating the credential, collect the log-search response without inventing server-side filters. The following standard-library program makes that read request and emits its JSON response. It doesn't assume an undocumented response layout or claim that retrieval alone establishes blast radius.
Set INFRAI_LOG_SEARCH_URL to the documented HTTPS log-search URL in your deployment configuration and INFRAI_API_KEY to an authorized operator credential. Use the configured service origin you trust. The compromised tenant secret should not be the investigator's credential. The path check prevents accidentally running this example against a write operation; it isn't a replacement for controlling environment configuration.
import json import os import time from datetime import datetime, timezone from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime from urllib.error import HTTPError from urllib.parse import urlsplit from urllib.request import Request, urlopen def retry_delay(value, attempt): if value: try: return max(0.0, float(value)) except ValueError: try: target = parsedate_to_datetime(value) return max( 0.0, (target - datetime.now(timezone.utc)).total_seconds(), ) except (TypeError, ValueError, OverflowError): pass return float(2 ** attempt) def collect_logs(): url = os.environ["INFRAI_LOG_SEARCH_URL"] parsed = urlsplit(url) if ( parsed.scheme != "https" or not parsed.hostname or parsed.path != "/v1/logs/search" or parsed.query or parsed.fragment or parsed.username or parsed.password ): raise ValueError("Use the configured HTTPS log-search URL") key = os.environ["INFRAI_API_KEY"] for attempt in range(4): request = Request( url, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {key}"}, method="GET", ) try: with urlopen(request, timeout=30) as response: if response.status != 200: raise RuntimeError(f"Unexpected HTTP {response.status}") return json.load(response) except HTTPError as error: detail = error.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") if error.code != 429 or attempt == 3: raise RuntimeError( f"Log search returned HTTP {error.code}: {detail}" ) from error time.sleep(retry_delay(error.headers.get("Retry-After"), attempt)) raise RuntimeError("Log collection did not complete") if __name__ == "__main__": print(json.dumps(collect_logs(), indent=2)) This read-only example makes at most 4 attempts, honors Retry-After when present, and otherwise backs off exponentially on rate limiting. The request timeout is 30 seconds; it is an example configuration, not a vendor latency guarantee. The program surfaces error details instead of treating an unsuccessful response as evidence. Don't paste the output into a public incident ticket without reviewing its contents. Store the response in the team's controlled evidence location and record when collection occurred.
Then inspect the returned structure before writing any local selector. Match the historical key identifier, retain the recorded tenant and resource association, and distinguish outcomes. For example, a synthetic event describing a denied read of editorial/clip-28 for newsroom-south would warrant examination, but it would not prove that the asset was read. Counting only successful operations can erase attempted scope crossing; counting every attempt as a disclosure overstates the blast radius.
Coverage remains separate.
The program cannot detect an uncollected service, prove that a logger wrote every event, or reconstruct an interval that was never retained. Document those limits alongside observed resources and outcomes before making an incident claim. In particular, don't label the result “all tenant access” until the collection coverage supports that statement. There is no assumed response schema here and no invented server-side key filter: retrieval and identity matching remain separate steps.
Rejected option: rotate and investigate later
For a confirmed leak, reject a runbook that stops at replacement and postpones the incident record until someone has time to search. It loses the distinction between routine credential maintenance and a compromise response, and it encourages an analyst to treat the currently deployed credential as the identity to investigate even though the historical records concern the exposed one. Write down the confirmation, report, rotation, distribution, and collection events as they happen. The timeline should say what was observed, which action completed, and what remains unknown.
Routine rotation still has a valid use case: scheduled credential maintenance without a confirmed compromise. It should preserve attribution through the change, but it needn't falsely classify that maintenance as an incident. Once exposure is confirmed, the additional report and evidence work have a different purpose.
For the media tenant, the decision ends with attributable observations: which private assets appear in the records, under which key identity, with which outcomes, and across which covered interval. Record unresolved coverage explicitly. That is a defensible blast-radius assessment; an empty search alone is not.