arXiv:2611.18173v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study a Stackelberg set selection game for linear systems subject to bounded disturbances and additive attacks. The defender selects the vector parameter of a polytopic safe set template; the attacker, after observing this choice, selects the vector parameter of an admissible attack set. The payoff is a signed, facet-normalised invariance margin that tests invariance exactly and quantifies either the available contraction or the facet inflation needed when invariance fails. Both controlled and robust controlled invariance are treated, corresponding to different information patterns for the control input. Exploiting the structure of parameterised polyhedra, we show that within each validity region the margin is concave in the attack parameter, which reduces the follower minimisation to finitely many extreme parameters. The complete max--min game is then solved by a finite family of LPs, one per defender validity region, each enforcing all attacker regions under a common defender decision and guaranteed margin. The framework handles hard state constraints and additional costs related to the safe set size, and recovers optimal set parameters together with state and attack realisations that activate the certificate. A load frequency control example under false data injection illustrates the construction, the validity decomposition, and the two information patterns.