arXiv:2509.14956v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multi-agent systems (MAS) built on large language models (LLMs) increasingly share a common conversational space, in which a single adversarial or erroneous message can propagate from one agent to many. This paper proposes Sentinel Agents, a dedicated security layer that monitors inter-agent communication with rule-based checks, behavioral analysis and LLM-based semantic inspection, and reports to a Coordinator Agent that enforces policy, for example by quarantining misbehaving agents. We describe the architecture, its deployment patterns and monitoring layers, and we evaluate a continuous-listener prototype on a balanced corpus of 1,000 synthetic messages (500 attacks across five families and 500 benign messages) with two local LLMs. LLM inspection with Gemma 4 12B reached F1 0.86 at a false-positive rate of 0.11, against 0.38 for rules alone. Combining components by logical OR did not improve on it, while a cascade in which only high-precision rules act on their own matched it. Calibrating the thresholds of the more conservative Qwen3 8B on a development split raised its held-out F1 from 0.56 to 0.80, and on multi-turn conversations the behavioral check detected patterns the rules missed but could not tell legitimate repetition from probing. The value of combining detectors therefore depends on the model, on its calibration and on the aggregation rule, and the results yield practical guidance for deploying Sentinel Agents.