Your password policy says 8 characters, one uppercase, one number, one symbol. You type Summer2024!! and the little meter turns green. Strong password, right?

Wrong. And the reason it is wrong is the reason most password meters are useless: they count characters, but attackers do not guess characters. They guess patterns.

The math your meter is hiding

Password strength is really one number: how many guesses does an attacker need? If your password is drawn at random from a pool of N possible characters and has length L, the guesses are N to the power of L, and the entropy in bits is L times log2(N).

Run the numbers:

  • 8 lowercase letters only: 26^8 is about 209 billion guesses, 37.6 bits. Against a stolen database hashed with a fast hash like MD5, where an attacker can try 10 billion guesses a second, that is 21 seconds.
  • 8 mixed characters (95 printable): 52.6 bits, about 6.6 quadrillion guesses. At 10 billion a second, that is 7.7 days.
  • 12 mixed characters: 78.8 bits. At 10 billion a second, that is 17,123 centuries.

Length is the whole game. Going from 8 to 12 mixed characters multiplies the guesses by roughly 80 billion. No clever symbol substitution does that.

Why Summer2024!! fails anyway

Here is the catch. Summer2024!! is 12 mixed characters, so the naive math says 78.8 bits and 17,123 centuries. But nobody brute-forces it character by character, because attackers try the cheap guesses first: a common word, then a year, then a symbol or two.

Rough it out: a few thousand common words, times a hundred plausible years, times a handful of symbol endings. That is on the order of 50 million guesses. At 10 billion guesses a second, that is under a second. The meter said strong because it saw 12 characters and four character classes. The attacker sees a word, a year, and two exclamation marks, and it is done before your coffee cools.

This is not a theoretical attack. Password cracking tools ship with exactly these rules: dictionary words first, then common appendages like years and !, then keyboard walks like qwerty and 1q2w3e4r, then repeated characters and sequences. A password built from predictable pieces is only as strong as its most predictable piece.

What actually makes a password strong

Three things, in order:

  1. Length first. A 16-character random password has about 105 bits of entropy. A 20-character passphrase made of random words is stronger still, and you can actually remember it.
  2. Randomness, not complexity theatre. Tr0ub4dor&3 is a famous example of a password that looks strong and is weak: it is a common word with the predictable substitutions attackers try first. Four random words beat one cleverly mangled word.
  3. Uniqueness per site. The strongest password in the world is worthless if you reuse it and one site leaks it. A password manager exists precisely so you never have to remember any of this.

And one rule that matters more than all three: never type a password you actually use into any online checker, including a good one. Test a lookalike with the same length and pattern instead. A checker that runs entirely in your browser never sends your password anywhere, but the habit of pasting real passwords into random web pages is itself the vulnerability.

Check yours, properly

A useful checker does not just count character classes. It should estimate entropy, flag the patterns attackers actually try (common words, years, keyboard walks, repeats, sequences), and translate the result into crack times for realistic attacks: a throttled online login, an unthrottled one, a slow hash like bcrypt, and a fast hash like MD5. The same password can be "66 years" against one and "21 seconds" against another, and both numbers are true.

I built one that does exactly that, free and entirely in your browser: check your password strength. It scores the password, lists what is weak about it, and tells you what to fix. Pair it with the password generator on the same site if yours does not survive the check.

The meter on your signup form is not lying to you on purpose. It just does not know what the attacker knows. Now you do.