arXiv:2610.40919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Communication links influence how strongly a malicious input at one sensor affects a consensus network. We study how a defender can reduce this influence by selecting one additional link after observing the currently attacked sensor. The attacked sensor changes over time, and vulnerability is measured by the trace of a finite-horizon controllability Gramian. A prescribed local epsilon-greedy attacker response rule defines a discounted Markov decision process for the defender. Exact dynamic programming (DP) provides an optimal policy using the full Gramian payoff matrix and attacker transition model. We then introduce approximate dynamic programming (ADP) that learns from sampled attacker transitions and empirical Gramian costs estimated from measured impulse responses. Under conditionally unbiased costs and standard sampling and learning-rate conditions, the learned action-value table converges to the exact DP solution. The analysis uses Bellman contraction and bounds the effect of persistent Gramian estimation bias, establishing when measured responses recover optimal defender decisions without constructing the full payoff matrix. In simulations on 20- and 100-node graphs, empirical ADP rollout costs are within 0.23% and 1.76%, respectively, of exact DP. In a two-dimensional intruder tracking example, both policies reduce network-wide root-mean-square tracking error spread by approximately 25% relative to an unmitigated attack.