arXiv:2611.17747v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) is the de facto standard trace for sensor-level source-camera attribution, and a high Peak-to-Correlation-Energy (PCE) between a questioned image and a camera reference fingerprint is routinely treated as strong evidence of common origin. The fingerprint-copy attack of Goljan, Fridrich and Chen (2011) shows that this signal can be forged: an adversary who estimates a target camera's fingerprint from that camera's publicly available images can inject a scaled copy of it into an unrelated photograph, producing a forgery that clears a PCE decision threshold despite never having been taken by the target device. We present prnucf, an open, auditable toolkit that pairs a reference implementation of the (additive) fingerprint-copy attack with the triangle-test detector and a cohort-calibrated decision procedure, so that practitioners can quantify how fragile a PRNU attribution is against this attack on their own pipelines. On a controlled multi-camera Monte-Carlo benchmark the attack reaches an arbitrary target PCE at a mean PSNR of 59.2 dB (visually lossless), yet the triangle test separates forgeries from innocent images with an area under the ROC curve of 0.999, detecting every forgery at a cohort-calibrated 5% false-positive operating point. We discuss why a fixed significance cut-off is not safe in casework, the limitations of synthetic validation, and the open problem of extending explainable detection to the modern, GAN-based generation of fingerprint-transfer attacks. The toolkit is released under the MIT license with an explicit dual-use statement.