arXiv:2611.06103v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Sensors bridge the physical and digital worlds, making their integrity critical to cyber-physical system security. Existing sensor attacks largely exploit unintended and sensor-specific physical vulnerabilities, limiting their generalizability and motivating a different threat model, i.e., whether an adversary can implant hidden attack surfaces into sensors before deployment. In this paper, we present SenTrojan, an analog hardware Trojan framework for sensors. SenTrojan embeds malicious functionality into analog signal circuitry commonly shared across diverse sensor architectures, and activates the hidden behavior through crafted external physical signals. Once activated, SenTrojan can induce sensor malfunctions ranging from permanent denial-of-service to static or dynamic spoofing. To achieve these effects under different architectural constraints, we introduce two complementary designs. The Logic-Rule-Driven (LRD) Trojan adds lightweight analog monitoring logic to detect trigger features such as frequency and amplitude, enabling reliable activation across various sensor types. The Physical-Effect-Driven (PED) Trojan targets sensors with exploitable native analog effects, e.g., nonlinearity and rectification, and realizes attacks with minimal component insertion. We evaluate SenTrojan on 14 sensors spanning 6 transduction principles and demonstrate its effectiveness across diverse real-world scenarios. Overall, SenTrojan achieves an average successful trigger rate above 95%, maintains over 97% similarity to benign behavior, incurs zero false-trigger rate for LRD designs, and introduces less than 5% average deviation in drift, noise floor, and response time. To our knowledge, this work is the first systematic study of analog sensor Trojans, broadening sensor security from unintended physical vulnerabilities to intentional supply-chain compromise.