Upgrade affected Node.js runtimes to at least 22.23.4, 24.22.1 or 26.12.1, and preferably to the 2026-11-11 security releases 22.23.5, 24.22.3 or 26.13.1, then restart and verify every serving process. CVE-2026-111497 lets attacker-controlled Brotli input corrupt memory in the native decoder used by node:zlib. Any 22.x, 24.x or 26.x service below those builds that decompresses Brotli from outside is exposed, and 20.x and older get no fix.
This guide is for systems you own or maintain.
Am I affected?
| Line | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| 26.x | below 26.12.1 | 26.12.1 |
| 24.x | below 24.22.1 | 24.22.1 |
| 22.x | below 22.23.4 | 22.23.4 |
| 20.x and older | always (end of life) | no fix |
Start with an inventory of the runtimes you have. These commands tell you what is installed or configured; they do not prove what an already running service executes, because each one reads a path or starts a fresh node.
# runtime inventory only which -a node | while read n; do echo "$n $($n -v)"; done # every node on PATH systemctl show -p ExecStart <service> # binary a unit is configured to start docker exec <container> node -p process.versions.node # starts a new process in the container kubectl exec <pod> -- node -p process.versions.node # same, per pod The authoritative answer comes from inside the serving process. Add this to a debug or health endpoint you already protect:
app.get('/internal/runtime', (req, res) => res.json({ pid: process.pid, node: process.versions.node, execPath: process.execPath, })); process.versions reports the runtime executing that code. Call it on every replica and every worker (cluster workers, PM2 instances, pods) and record the PID or instance ID next to the version, so one patched replica behind a load balancer cannot answer for the rest.
To see which of your own inputs reach the decoder:
grep -rnE "brotliDecompress|createBrotliDecompress|BrotliDecompress" \ --include='*.js' --include='*.mjs' --include='*.ts' . | grep -v node_modules No match does not clear you. Dependencies call node:zlib on your behalf, and The Hacker News reports fetch() of br responses as another path. The official advisory names node:zlib only.
Fix it now
nvm install 22 && nvm alias default 22 # resolves to 22.23.4 or newer brew upgrade node@22 # Homebrew sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install --only-upgrade nodejs # NodeSource deb sudo dnf upgrade nodejs # rpm based # 22.23.4 fixes CVE-2026-111497; 22.23.5 (2026-11-11) adds later security fixes FROM node:22.23.5-bookworm-slim Build containers with docker build --pull so a cached base layer is not reused. If your distribution links Node against a shared system Brotli library, the fix ships in that library's package; check your distribution's tracker for CVE-2026-111497.
A new binary on disk changes nothing for a process that started earlier. Restart, then call the endpoint on each instance:
sudo systemctl restart <service> pm2 restart all kubectl rollout restart deployment/<name> && kubectl rollout status deployment/<name> Done means every PID or pod you listed answers with a fixed node version and the execPath you expect.
Why it is dangerous
Decompression runs at the edge of a service. An HTTP client decoding an upstream response, a proxy written in Node, or an upload handler inflating a request body all pass untrusted bytes to the decoder before validation or business logic sees them. That decoder is native code living in the same address space as your application, its secrets and its sockets.
upstream response / upload / message │ untrusted bytes, Content-Encoding: br v node:zlib Brotli stream ──> native decoder state machine │ invalid block switch │ status: "need more input" (should be: format error) v caller keeps feeding chunks v 8-byte internal buffer overrun ──> process memory corrupted The fault is in how the decoder classifies one bad state. Per the Node.js advisory, the decoder treats an invalid block switch as a request for more input. Continued decoding can overrun its eight-byte internal buffer and corrupt process memory. The advisory lists crashes, memory disclosure and remote code execution as possible outcomes. CISA added the Brotli flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-10-27, which records exploitation in the wild.
A streaming caller does the reasonable thing with "need more input": it supplies the next chunk. A permanent error would have ended the stream. That is why streaming decode paths on untrusted data are the ones to patch first.
Reproduce
We ran node labs/security/node-brotli-check-lab/node-brotli-check-lab.mjs on our Mac on 2026-11-07 at 02:33 UTC (saved output in last-run.txt). The lab does not modify the installed runtime and never sends malformed Brotli data. The Node on PATH, /usr/local/bin/node, reported 22.13.1, below the fixed 22.23.4.
Experiment
The lab downloaded the official node-v22.23.4-darwin-arm64 build to a temp folder, matched its SHA-256 against nodejs.org's SHASUMS256.txt, and ran the same checks with both binaries.
| Test | Input | 22.13.1 | 22.23.4 |
|---|---|---|---|
| below fixed version | node version | true | false |
| Brotli round trip, sync API | 64 JSON rows | ok 7a3d975 | ok 7a3d975 |
| Brotli round trip, sync API | 4096 JSON rows | ok 0b20394 | ok 0b20394 |
The hashes are the first characters of the SHA-256 of the decompressed output. Both JSON fixtures round-tripped successfully on both builds, with identical output.
Fix
Staying in the same major line keeps the change small: 22.13.1 to 22.23.4. The new build met the fixed-version threshold. The scan found no matching Brotli API references in 329 scanned source files, with node_modules excluded. We still patch, since dependencies and fetch() can decode br without our code naming the API.
Report
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| below fixed version (22.13.1) | 1/1 |
| fixed-version threshold met (22.23.4) | 1/1 |
| valid round trips passed on both | 2/2 |
The capture uses the lab's older labels ("attack inputs", "REPRODUCED", "BLOCKED"). Read them as the version comparison in the table above: no attack input was supplied.
What this lab does not prove: it does not reproduce the vulnerability or validate the fix. The memory write and its closure in 22.23.4 rest on the Node.js advisory. We compared versions on one Mac, tested only the synchronous API on two JSON fixtures, and looked at none of your containers or dependencies. Our take: the restart is where teams slip. A patched CLI next to a long-running old process looks fine from the shell, so the per-instance endpoint is the check we trust.
If you cannot update today
The official advisory lists no workaround or configuration switch. The remedy is the fixed release, and for 20.x and older a move to a supported line. Until then, rank services by exposure: those that decode Brotli from external upstreams, uploads or third-party messages go first. Verification after patching is the same per-instance process.versions.node check, with the PID or pod name recorded.
Timeline and sources
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-21 | Node.js releases 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 with the fix for CVE-2026-111497 |
| 2026-10-27 | CISA adds CVE-2026-111497 to the KEV catalog, due 2026-11-10 |
| 2026-11-07 | Our lab run: 22.13.1 below the fixed version, 22.23.4 meets it |
| 2026-11-11 | Node.js security releases 22.23.5, 24.22.3 and 26.13.1 (advisory); the 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 builds above need this newer release too, see our Node.js HTTP/2 vulnerability check |
We never call brotliDecompress ourselves. Are we exposed?
Possibly. HTTP clients, proxies and body parsers call node:zlib for you, and The Hacker News reports fetch() of br responses as a path. The official advisory names node:zlib only. Patch the runtime whatever your own code does.
Do we need to rebuild native addons?
Native addons using V8 or Node-specific APIs may need rebuilding across majors. Node-API addons can remain compatible; check each dependency. A patch release inside your current major line is the smallest change.
Our image is pinned to a fixed node tag. Is that enough?
Rebuild with docker build --pull, redeploy, and verify each running instance. A fixed tag sets the intended runtime version; the running containers are what you check.
Related on this site: the Node.js security guide, the APT signature check and the Rails upload flaw check, which use the same check-the-running-version habit.

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