Coraza WAF policy lives in configuration and logs, not a single product banner
Coraza is a Go web application firewall framework that embeds in servers, proxies, and connectors. Its deployment can inherit the web server's title, so an internet title search is a weak way to count installations. The useful evidence is the rule engine mode, the connector boundary, and the audit trail.
What ZoomEye returned
I queried the index on 2026-11-18 at 22:44 UTC with sub_type=all, page 1, and pagesize 1. The results were:
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app="Coraza": 10 matches. -
title="Coraza": 11 matches. -
http.body="Coraza": 502 matches.
The application and title counts are close, while the body count is broader. Coraza appears in project documentation, tutorials, and responses from applications that mention the project. The 502 count is not a count of active WAFs. It is a candidate set for further inspection, and the exact query link is included below.
Rule mode and connector scope
The Coraza project documentation describes ModSecurity-compatible rules and OWASP Core Ruleset integration. The recommended configuration includes rule-engine modes such as On, Off, and DetectionOnly. A deployment that remains in detection mode may log an attack without blocking it. That is a legitimate rollout choice, but an operator should know which mode is active on each protected route.
The connector determines where request and response data pass through the engine. Coraza can run as an embedded library, a reverse proxy, a Caddy connector, or another integration. Review body limits, file upload handling, multipart parsing, and timeouts. A WAF that cannot inspect a request body because of a connector limit will not enforce a rule that depends on that body, even when the rule is loaded.
Preserve the audit evidence
Capture the loaded rule set, rule-engine mode, connector version, and sample audit events. Compare a known blocked request with a request that should pass. Verify that the rule ID, matched variable, action, and transaction identifier appear in the log. Protect the audit log from modification by the same process that handles untrusted traffic.
If the response is only a generic block page, keep the internal transaction record as the source of truth. Rotate and review exception rules because a broad exclusion can disable protection for a whole route. The public count gives a research baseline. The configuration and audit evidence explain whether Coraza is actually enforcing the policy the team intended.

